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COMMENT
The Repressed Memory Phenomenon: Are Recovered Memories
Scientifically Valid Evidence Under Daubert?
If you genuinely think you were abused and your life shows the symp-
toms, there's a strong likelihood that you were .... If your memories
of the abuse are still fuzzy, it is important to realize that you may be
grilled for details .... Of course, such demands for proof are unrea-
sonable. You are not responsible for proving that you were abused.
The Courage to Heal: A Guide
for Women Survivors of Child
Sexual Abuse1
I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual abuse of children is a terrifying social problem in America.2
According to the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, there
were 130,000 confirmed cases of child sexual abuse in 1992.1 General
population surveys indicate that between twelve and thirty-eight per-
cent of women and between three and sixteen percent of men were
subjected to some form of sexual abuse during their childhood.4
While it is imperative that society protect its children from sexual
abuse, it must also consider the frightening prospect that a person may
be falsely accused of sexually abusing a child.5
In recent years, many adult men and women have claimed to have
recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse. These recollections
have usually been recovered with the help of psychotherapy. While
some juries have believed the allegations, scientists have challenged
the validity of repressed memories. Scientists argue that "many of
these recollections are false creations, born of patients' suggestibility
and their therapists' leading statements."6 Even psychologists and
1. ELLEN BASS AND LAURA DAVIS. THE COURAGE TO HEAL: A GUIDE FOR WOMEN
SURVIVORS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 26, 148 (3d ed. 1994).
2. Robert G. Marks, Should We Believe the People Who Believe the Children?: The Need
for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207
(1995).
3. Fred Taskar, Repressed Memory Backlash Spreads, BALTIMORE MORmING SUN, Apr. 18,
1995, at 6D.
4. Marks, supra note 2, at 207.
5. Id
6. Christine Gorman, Memory on Trial, TIME, Apr. 17, 1995, at 54.
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psychiatrists are bitterly divided over the premise that the memory of
abuse can be completely erased and then recovered, virtually intact.7
According to the False Memory Syndrome Foundation,8 since the
mid-1980's, approximately 800 criminal and civil cases have been filed
in United States courts based on recovered memories of childhood
sexual abuse.9 These cases present a dilemma for the justice system:
if no one can say for sure, absent corroborating evidence, that a re-
pressed memory is true, how then is a judge or jury to decide?' °
This comment argues that repressed memories of childhood sexual
abuse retrieved through therapy are not scientifically valid evidence
under the test promulgated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc." Because the truth of retrieved repressed memories cannot
be proven or disproven,' 2 evidence of such memories should not be
admitted unless there is outside corroboration.
Until recently, the primary issue in repressed memory cases was the
statute of limitations. Some courts have invoked the discovery rule,
thus tolling the applicable statute of limitations. 13 Under the discov-
ery rule, a statute of limitations will not begin to run until a plaintiff
"discovers or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have dis-
covered both the fact of his injury and the cause thereof."'14 Plaintiffs
have benefitted from legislation which extends the civil statute of limi-
tations for child sexual abuse on the basis of the delayed discovery
7. Id.
8. The False Memory Syndrome Foundation was established in 1992 as a support group for
families involved in accusations of abuse based on repressed memories. According to the Foun-
dation's mission statement, the purpose of the Foundation is "to seek the reasons for the spread
of false memory syndrome; to work for the prevention of new cases of false memory syndrome;
to aid the victims of false memory syndrome; and to bring their families into reconciliation."
False memory syndrome has been defined by John F. Kihlstrom, Ph.D., as "a condition in which
a person's identity and interpersonal relationships are centered around a memory of traumatic
experience which is objectively false but in which the person strongly believes...." False Mem-
ory Syndrome Foundation Pamphlet, VoL 95.4.
9. Mark MacNamara, Fade Away: The Rise and Fall of the Repressed Memory Theory in
the Courtroom, 15 CAL. L. REv. 36 (1995).
10. Carol Ness, Legal Challenge: Suits Over Incest, SAN FiRA&cisco EXAMINER, Apr. 7,
1993, at Al. The article quotes a judge, who presided over a criminal trial during which a lawyer
was acquitted of charges brought by his adult daughter that she remembered abuse from age two
to ten, as stating, "What I have to decide is if this is a real memory or a created memory." Id.
11. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). See Part IV of this comment for a detailed discussion of the
threshold standard governing the admissibility of expert testimony.
12. EUzABm LoFrUs & KATHERnm KEc AM, TmE M=T OF REPRESSED MEMORY 163
(1994). See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
13. See Vesecky v. Vesecky, 880 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Hoult v. Hoult, 792 F.
Supp. 143 (D.C. Mass. 1992); McCollum v. D'Arcy, 638 A.2d 797 (N.H. 1994).
14. See McCollum, 638 A.2d at 798.
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doctrine,15 and courts have tolled the statute of limitations under disa-
bility statutes.' 6
Courts have recently begun considering the scientific validity of the
phenomenon of memory repression and the process of therapy used
to recover those memories. 17 This concern for scientific validity ap-
plies to both lay witness testimony1s and expert testimony.' 9 The re-
quirement of scientific validation was made clear in McCollum v.
D'Arcy20 when the New Hampshire Supreme Court, while finding
that the discovery rule applied in a civil action based on an assault that
allegedly occurred over thirty-five years before, remanded the case
with an admonition to the trial court. The court stated that the plain-
tiff would have to substantiate her allegations of abuse, and "if chal-
lenged, to validate the phenomenon of memory repression itself and
the admissibility of evidence flowing therefrom."'"
With the Supreme Court's ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' the threshold for admission of expert testi-
mony moved from whether the scientific technique had gained general
acceptance within its particular field to the "validity and soundness of
the scientific method used to generate the evidence."'  Because there
is no empirical evidence to support the theory that a person can lose a
memory for many years and then accurately recover it, 4 plaintiffs
may be unable to meet this burden.
Part II of this comment discusses the nature of memory, repression
and retrieval. Part HI examines repressed memory therapy and tech-
niques used to retrieve the memories. Part III also reviews cases in-
volving repressed memories and various psychotherapy techniques
through which such memories were retrieved. Part IV analyzes the
15. These states include Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, South Dakota,
Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. Christina Bannon, Comment, Recovered Memories of
Childhood Sexual Abuse: Should the Courts Get Involved When Mental Health Professionals
Disagree? 26 Asuz. ST. L.J. 835, 841 n.57 (1994).
16. See Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Leonard v. England,
115 N.C. App. 103, 445 S.E.2d 50 (1994), cert. granted, 337 N.C. 801, 449 S.E.2d 571 (1994), and
cert vacated, 340 N.C. 113, 455 S.E.2d 663 (1995).
17. See Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Mich. 1995); New Hampshire v.
Hungerford, No. 94-S-045, 1995 WL 378571, at *1 (N.H. Super. May 23, 1995) (declaring that
testimony of recovered memories was inadmissible in two aggravated felonious sexual assault
cases).
18. See Hungerford, 1995 WL 378571 at *1.
19. See Isely, 877 F. Supp. at 1055.
20. 638 A.2d 797 (N.H. 1994).
21. Id. at 800.
22. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
23. Isely, 877 F. Supp. at 1061.
24. Miriam Horn, Memories Lost and Found, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Nov. 29, 1993, at
52.
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courts' dilemma, especially in light of Daubert, of determining
whether the phenomenon of memory repression and recovery is scien-
tifically valid.
II. Tim MEMORY PROCESS
"Memory is not objective fact, but subjective, suggestible, and
malleable."'
Repression of a memory is more than "ordinary forgetting," which
is the act of simply not thinking about an experience or event for some
period of time and then having the memory come back to mind.
6
"Repression refers to the active banishment into the unconscious of a
traumatic event or series of traumas. '2 7 The mind uses repression as a
defense mechanism. When a person experiences a traumatic event
and is then unable to function normally in life because the memories
are too overwhelming, he or she may repress the memory in order to
cope.28 Repression of memories is often a coping mechanism for chil-
dren who are sexually abused. Feelings of confusion and helplessness
resulting from the inability to stop the abuse or to seek outside assist-
ance lead many victims to internalize the pain, fear, confusion and
guilt. This internalization then leads to a denial of the events and a
repression of memories of the abuse incidents.2 9 However, because of
the traumatic nature of the events that lead to repression, researchers
have been unable to design experiments that will enable them to study
the repression and subsequent retrieval of the memory.30 Studies con-
ducted on the veracity of recovered memories of abuse have con-
cluded that while memory repression does occur, some memories of
abuse are almost certainly false?
1
Traditional memory is divided into three stages: perception, reten-
tion, and retrieval.32 During the perception phase, a person exper-
iences an event which is then committed to memory. The accuracy of
the memory is affected by factors such as time of exposure, familiarity
with the subject, and stressfulness of the event. If the person initially
misperceives the event, an inaccurate memory results since an accu-
rate memory was never recorded. Several factors may cause a person
25. Id. (quoting Elizabeth F. Loftus, a psychologist and leading expert on memory).
26. LoFrus & KHTCH M, supra note 12, at 141.
27. Id.
28. Garry M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Cau-
tion About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84 1. Cnpm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 129, 133 (1993).
29. Id. at 136-37.
30. Id. at 133. The severe trauma necessary to induce repression could not ethically be
reproduced in an experimental setting. Id. at 134.
31. Biology Enters Repressed Memory Fray, JAMA, Dec. 14, 1994, at 22.
32. Emsdorff & Loftus, supra note 28, at 133.
1996]
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to perceive qualities that do not occur. First, since the initial forma-
tion of memory is heavily influenced by context, important aspects of
the event may not be included in the memory if they are not relevant
to the context the person is using at the time of the event. Second, the
person may either exaggerate or ignore certain aspects, depending on
the person's expectancy of the event while it is occurring.33
Once the perceived event is over, some information is stored in
memory.34 It is believed that memory of a single event is not stored
just in one place in the brain. According to Elizabeth Loftus, a psy-
chologist and leading expert on memory, "[w]hole memories - for ex-
ample, the memory of your wedding day or your 10th birthday party -
are not stored in one particular place but distributed throughout the
brain. '3 5 During the ensuing period of time, the person may be ex-
posed to new information which may influence his or her recollection
of the past. A repressed memory is also affected by new inputs and it
may be altered by additional information received. As time passes,
memory becomes increasingly malleable and susceptible to new infor-
mation. Because the alleged events comprising a repressed memory
happened such a long time ago, the memory is especially vulnerable to
new input. Also, a repressed memory is not consciously rehearsed;
thus, unlike a favorable scene from childhood that people occasionally
recall, the repressed memory does not have that opportunity to be-
come stronger and more vivid. At the same time, the repressed mem-
ory also avoids modification of the memory which sometimes happens
with reconstructive rehearsal.3 6
The final stage in the memory process is the retrieval of the mem-
ory.3 7 The retrieval of a memory can be influenced by the environ-
ment in which it is retrieved, expectations created in the person's
mind, the persons present during the retrieval, and the techniques
used to retrieve the memory.38 When an event is recalled, the person
must reconstruct the memory.3 9 With each recollection, the memory
can be changed or colored by succeeding events, other people's recol-
lections or suggestions, or the context in which it is retrieved.40
33. Id. at 156.
34. ld.
35. Loirus & KETcHAM, supra note 12, at 4. See also MARK PENDERORAST, VIcrMS OF
MEMORY 111-12 (1995) (quoting biological memory expert Larry Squire as saying, "Memory for
whole events is stored widely, not in a single location .... [R]ecollection of past events is a
reconstruction from fragments, not a veridical playback of past events"). Id
36. Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 28, at 157-58.
37. Id at 158.
38. Id
39. ELIZABETH LOFTuS & KATHERINE KETCI-AM, wITNEss FOR THE DEFENSE 20 (1991).
40. l
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Science writer Jeremy Campbell wrote the following about the re-
trieval process:
[O]ne's mind readily accepts imperfect information... filling in the
missing parts from its large reserves of worldly knowledge .... In
remembering, people not only distort and interpret information from
the past so as to make it fit what they know or believe in the present;
they seem to add new information. The more distant the event, the
more material the mind adds.41
An experiment conducted by Loftus revealed that it is possible to
inject into someone's mind a detailed memory of a childhood event
that never happened.42 In the experiment, a colleague of Loftus told
his younger brother, Chris, that he had been lost at age five in a shop-
ping mall. Over the next several days, Chris recalled his feelings
about being lost. A few weeks later, Chris was interviewed again
about the false memory; he characterized his memory as reasonably
clear and vivid, and even added details that had not been in his
brother's original story. When told that his "getting lost" memory was
made up, Chris was amazed. "Really! I thought I remembered get-
ting lost."43
Yet other research seems to indicate that extreme trauma can be
repressed. In 1992, sociologist Linda Williams of the University of
New Hampshire tracked down 129 women who, as children, had been
taken to emergency rooms in the late 1970's for abuse-related injuries.
Only thirty-eight percent, representing twenty women, said they could
not remember their hospitalizations." According to Williams, her
findings "support clinicians' impressions that some people who have
been abused present for treatment with no recollection of their history
of child sexual abuse."'45 Loftus discounts Williams' findings, saying
that "it is misleading to assume that simple failure to remember means
repression has occurred."'
41. PENDERrRAST, supra note 35, at 116, 118.
42. Elizabeth F. Loftus, You Must Remember This... Or Do You? How Real are Repressed
Memories? WASH. PosT, June 27, 1993, at C01 [hereinafter You Must Remember This].
43. Id. Chris' recollection is an example of a confabulation, which is defined as an "illusory
memory." See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
44. Gorman, supra note 6. See also Katy Butler, Clashing Memories, Mixed Messages, L.A.
TIMES, June 26, 1994, at 12.
45. Linda M. Williams, What Does it Mean to Forget Child Sexual Abuse? J. OF CONSuLTrN
Am CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1185 (1994).
46. Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 522, May
1993.
6
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III. REPRESSED MEMORY THERAPY
When a patient enters therapy, he or she is usually in a vulnerable,
distressed frame of mind.47 Because the patient is dependent on the
therapist, the therapist has the opportunity to exert enormous influ-
ence. 48 New clients can be exceedingly vulnerable to influence, and
are most susceptible to suggestion since they are normally unsure
about what is wrong with them.49 Therapists see problems, rather
than strengths, because that is what they are trained to see.50 In an
effort to cure a patient's problem, many therapists concentrate on
having the patient "mak[e] contact with the past. ' 51 When patients
relate stories of their childhood, therapists may try to provide insights
into those past experiences. Because therapists bring into the thera-
peutic environment their own assumptions, biases, and expectations,
they may suggest causes for the patient's behavior that do not exist.
5 2
These suggestive methods are at the heart of the controversy regard-
ing repressed memories. Techniques used by therapists to unearth
buried memories include hypnosis, instructing the patient to read vari-
ous books,53 and barbiturates such as sodium amytal and sodium
pentothal.54
Hypnosis
The 1990 murder trial of George Franklin was the nation's first
prosecution of a crime based on repressed memory.5 5 In November
1990, Franklin was convicted of the first degree murder of Susan
Nason, whose body was found in December 1969 near her home in
San Mateo County, California.56 In 1989, Eileen Franklin-Lipsker,
Franklin's daughter and classmate of Nason, told authorities that af-
ter looking at her daughter one recent afternoon, she first
remembered that she had witnessed the 1969 murder of Nason and
that her father was the murderer.5 7 Based on his daughter's trial testi-
47. PENDERORAST, supra note 35, at 511.
48. Id.
49. Richard Ofse & Ethan Watters, Making Monsters, SocmarY, Mar-Apr 1993, at 4.
50. PENDERGRASr, supra note 35, at 513.
51. LoFrus & KETcRAM, supra note 12, at 266.
52. Id. at 267. One example of therapists' assumptions was evidenced in a survey conducted
by psychologist Michael Yapko. Out of 900 San Diego therapists surveyed, forty-three percent
said they would assume a client had a traumatic childhood if the client did not remember much
about it. Glenn Kessler, Repressed Memories-A Legal-Psychological Tangle, NEWSDAY, Nov.
28, 1993, at 7.
53. Bannon, supra note 15, at 837.
54. PENDERGRA T, supra note 35, at 149. See notes 103-09 and acompanying text for a
discussion of Joyce-Couch v. DeSilva, 602 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio App. 1991).
55. 'Recovered-Memory' Murder Reversal, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 17, 1995, at AS.
56. Franklin v. Duncan, 884 F. Supp. 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
57. Id. at 1440.
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mony, Franklin was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.58
On April 5, 1995, a federal judge overturned the conviction by grant-
ing Franklin's writ of habeas corpus. 9
During the trial, the defense raised the possibility that Franklin-Lip-
sker's testimony was based on a false memory that was triggered dur-
ing hypnosis.6 0 Her brother testified that she told him in August 1989
that a memory of her father committing a murder had surfaced under
hypnosis.61 However, after being told by an attorney in November
1989 that she would be an "invalid witness" if she had undergone hyp-
nosis,62 she retracted her statement and told her brother not to men-
tion hypnosis during his testimony.63
Two eminent experts in the field of psychiatry testified during
Franklin's trial on the veracity of a recovered memory, and their testi-
mony was directly contradictoryf' Dr. Lenore Terr, a psychiatry pro-
fessor and specialist in the field of childhood trauma and the type of
memory created by such trauma, testified for the prosecution. Ac-
cording to Terr, a true recovered memory could be differentiated from
a false one by three factors: the subject's symptoms, the level of detail
of the memory, and the level of emotion accompanying the subject's
reporting of the memory. Terr concluded that Franklin-Lipsker fit the
profile of a memory repressor, and that her memory had returned in
the manner of a true memory.65 In contrast, Dr. David Spiegel, a pro-
fessor of psychiatry at Stanford Medical School, testified for the de-
fense that it was extremely difficult to tell a false memory from a true
one. "The older the memory.., the more likely it [is] to combine fact
and fantasy: when events are kept out of awareness and kept uncon-
scious, there's certainly opportunity for transformation of the events
to occur."' 66 Dr. Spiegel further testified that memories could be influ-
enced by suggestion and that people who had suffered traumas were
more suggestible than people who had not. Dr. Spiegel concluded
that a person such as Franklin-Lipsker, who had suffered repeated
traumatic experiences, might be more likely to have false memories.67
58. Id. at 1438.
59. Id. at 1437.
60. Id. at 1442.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1442, n.4.
63. Id. at 1442.
64. Victor Barall, Thanks for the Memories: Criminal Law and the Psychology of Memory,
59 BROOK. L. REv. 1473, 1490-92 (1994) (book review).
65. Id. at 1491.
66. Id. at 1492.
67. Id. Franklin-Lipsker testified to being sexually abused by her father on two occasions,
once when she was five years old, and again when she was seven. These memories were not
repressed. Id. at 1488.
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In its decision reversing Franklin's conviction, the court stated that
establishing whether an asserted memory is true or not is a function of
the trial process.6" The court cautioned that "asserted memories of
events long past must be subject to rigorous scrutiny," and "a memory
which does not even exist for a long passage of time and then is 're-
covered' must be at least subject to that same rigorous scrutiny."69
In March 1995, the State of Nevada fied a motion to dismiss
charges of sexual and/or ritual abuse in a case where the victim recov-
ered memories of the abuse while hypnotized.7" In an earlier eviden-
tiary hearing, the court had barred evidence of memories retrieved
through hypnosis and expert testimony regarding the retrieval of re-
pressed memories through hypnosis. Citing the American Medical
Association's 1994 report questioning the authenticity of recovered
memories71 and in anticipation of defense counsel's expected analysis
on the accuracy and reliability of repressed memories, the State
moved for dismissal of the charges.72 The motion was granted.73
Experts agree that memories retrieved under hypnosis are often
mixtures of fantasy and truth.74 According to the Comprehensive
Textbook of Psychiatry, "the hypnotized individual has a pronounced
tendency to confabulate in those areas where there is little or no recol-
lection.., and.., there is a high likelihood that the beliefs of the
hypnotist will somehow be communicated to the patient in hypnosis
... ,75 The American Medical Association has issued words of cau-
tion about the use of hypnosis in memory recovery, stating that "new
information is often reported under hypnosis, and... while that infor-
mation may be accurate, it may also include confabulations and
pseudomemories." 76 In its Statement on Memories of Sexual Abuse,
the American Psychiatric Association warned that "special knowledge
and experience are necessary to properly evaluate and/or treat pa-
tients who report the emergence of memories during the use of spe-
cialized interview techniques (e.g., the use of hypnosis or amytal)
"77
68. Franklin, 884 F. Supp. at 1438.
69. Id
70. Nevada v. Dorsey, No. 31163 (Douglas County, Nev., Mar. 8, 1995).
71. See infra text accompanying note 76.
72. See supra note 70.
73. Nevada v. Dorsey, No. 31163 (Douglas County, Nev., Mar. 10, 1995).
74. PENDERGRAST, supra note 35, at 126.
75. Id. at 126 (quoting CoMPREHENsIvE TaxrBOOK OF PsYcmATRY 1516 (Harold I. Kaplan
ed., 5th ed. 1989)).
76. Am. Medical Ass'n, Report of the Council on Scientific Affairs, CSA Report S-A-94, at 2
[hereinafter AMA Report]. "Confabulations" have been defined as "illusory memories."
PENDERGRAsT, supra note 35, at 126.
77. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Statement on Memories of Sexual Abuse, Dec. 12, 1993, at 4.
9
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The Supreme Court had occasion to address the reliability of hyp-
nosis in Rock v. Arkansas.78 In a five-to-four decision, the Court ruled
that Arkansas' per se rule excluding all posthypnosis testimony imper-
missibly infringed on the defendant's right to testify in her own de-
fense.7 9 The defendant, charged with manslaughter in the shooting of
her husband, twice underwent hypnosis by a trained neuro-
psychologist to refresh her memory as to the precise details of the
shooting.80 While acknowledging that hypnosis may produce inaccu-
rate testimony, the majority found two factors present that indicated
that the defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony may be reliable
enough to have warranted its admissibility at trial. First, her proffered
testimony concerning the defective condition of the gun was corrobo-
rated by a gun expert. After hypnosis, the defendant recalled that her
finger had not been on the trigger and that the gun had discharged
when her husband grabbed her arm during the scuffle. The gun expert
testified at trial that the gun was prone to fire when hit or dropped,
without the trigger being pulled.81 The second factor the Court relied
on was the absence of leading questions by the neuropsychologist dur-
ing the taped hypnosis sessions.82
In the Rock opinion, the Court described hypnosis as "involv[ing]
the focusing of attention; increased responsiveness to suggestions; sus-
pension of disbelief with a lowering of critical judgment; potential for
altering perception, motor control, or memory in response to sugges-
tions; and the subjective experience of responding involuntarily.
83
Voicing concerns similar to those expressed by critics of repressed
memory hypnotic therapy, the Court noted three characteristics of
hypnosis that may lead to the production of false memories: (1) the
subject becomes suggestible and may try to please the hypnotist with
answers the subject believes will be met with approval; (2) the subject
may confabulate - fill in details from his or her imagination to make
an answer more coherent and complete; and (3) the subject exper-
iences "memory hardening" which instills great confidence in both
true and false memories, making effective cross-examination more dif-
78. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
79. L at 62. The majority based its ruling on constitutional grounds, finding that limiting
the defendant's testimony violated her Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id at 51-
52.
80. Id. at 44.
81. Id. at 47.
82. Id. at 62.
83. Id. at 59, n.17 (quoting Council on Scientific Affairs, Scientific Status of Refreshing
Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis, 253 JAMA 1918, 1919 (1985)).
1996]
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ficult. 4 "The most common response to hypnosis... appears to be an
increase in both correct and incorrect recollections."8 5
Certain procedural safeguards, according to the Court, can reduce
the inaccuracies hypnosis produces. Hypnosis should be performed
only by a psychiatrist or psychologist who is trained in its use and who
is independent of the investigation.8 6 Also, interrogations before, dur-
ing and after hypnosis should be recorded by tape or video to reveal
whether leading questions were asked.8s Finally, corroborating evi-
dence of the hypnotically refreshed testimony will verify the accuracy
of the information recalled as a result of hypnosis.88
Over twenty-five states exclude hypnotically refreshed testimony.
These courts have found that such testimony is "either inherently un-
reliable or at least that its reliability has little support from the rele-
vant scientific community."8 9  In North Carolina, hypnotically
refreshed testimony is inadmissible in judicial proceedings because it
"is simply too unreliable to be used as evidence in a judicial setting."9
Reading Lists
Many therapists who believe their patients are victims of childhood
sexual abuse recommend one of a growing number of self-help books
which contain symptom lists.91 These lists are designed to help survi-
vors recognize both the extent of the damage caused by the abuse and
its continuing impact on their lives.9 E. Sue Blume defended her "In-
cest Survivors Aftereffects Checklist" by saying the list "can serve as a
diagnosis device for suggesting sexual victimization when none is
remembered." 93 Among the list of characteristics that are diagnostic
of an incest survivor are the fear of being alone in the dark, night-
mares, poor body image, headaches, arthritis, adult nervousness, fear
of losing control, guilt, shame, low self-esteem, feeling crazy, feeling
different, and "denial, no awareness at all."94
84. Id. at 59-60.
85. Id. at 59. According to the JAMA Council Report, there is no data to support the
premise that hypnosis increases remembering only accurate information. Id. at 60, n.18.
86. Id. at 60. The Court also recommended that only the hypnotist and the subject be pres-
ent during the session. Id.
87. Id. "Such guidelines do not guarantee the accuracy of the testimony.., but they do
provide a means of controlling overt suggestions." Id
88. ld. at 61.
89. ERNSDORFI & LoFrus, supra note 28, at 162, n.169.
90. State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 532, 319 S.E.2d 177, 187 (1984).
91. LoFrus & KTCHAM, supra note 12, at 154.
92. id at 154.
93. Id. at 155. The list is included in Blume's book SECRET SURVIVORS: UNCOVERING IN-
cEst AND ITS AFtERE crs IN WoMEN (1991). Id. at 21-22.
94. Id. at 22.
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The symptoms list from The Courage to Heal contains similar char-
acteristics which, if satisfied, are meant to suggest the patient was
abused: powerlessness, feeling different, inability to express feelings,
depression, substance abuse, eating disorders (overweight or
anorexic), and loneliness.95 Critics argue that these lists are so general
they can cover the entire human race. In reviewing the list from The
Courage to Heal, psychologist Carol Tavris commented, "[t]he same
list could be used to identify oneself as someone who loves too much,
someone who suffers from self-defeating personality disorder, or a
mere human being in the late 20th century. The list is general enough
to include everybody at least sometimes. Nobody doesn't fit it."96
The suggestive power of techniques such as the symptoms list has
been addressed by the American Psychiatric Association. It warns
that "memories ... can be significantly influenced by a trusted person
(eg, therapist...) who suggests abuse as an explanation for symptoms/
problems, despite initial lack of memory of such abuse."97
Sodium Pentothal and Sodium Amytal
Among the barbiturates administered during memory recovery
therapy are sodium pentothal and sodium amytal.98 Some critics view
interviews which involve amytal or pentothal as more likely to pro-
duce confabulations than simple hypnosis. 99 Without corroborating
evidence, "even the most skilled clinician cannot evaluate the truth of
drug-induced statements."'100 Like hypnosis, these drugs render the
patient more relaxed and suggestible. According to psychiatrist Au-
gust Piper, Jr., amytal produces a state similar to alcohol intoxication:
"slurred speech, drowsiness, a feeling of warmth, distorted memory,
and an altered time-sense." 01 The American Medical Association has
cautioned that "amytal... has no legitimate use in recovered-memory
cases."' 02
95. PENDERGRAST, supra note 35, at 63.
96. LoFrus & KETCHAM, supra note 12, at 154-55.
97. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 77.
98. Both drugs are commonly referred to as "truth serum." Bannon, supra note 15, at
n.109. See also Leonard v. England, 115 N.C. App. 103,445 S.E.2d 50 (1994). According to the
plaintiff's treating physician who performed the sodium amytal interview during which the plain-
tiff recovered memories of sexual, physical, and emotional abuse, the drug is "used for therapeu-
tic interviews and is recognized as an effective treatment for disorders involving repression." Id.
at 105, 445 S.E.2d at 51.
99. PENDERcGASTr, supra note 35, at 149.
100. Elizabeth F. Loftus & Laura A. Rosenwald, Buried Memories Shattered Lives, 79-Nov.
A.B.A. J. 70, 73 (1993).
101. PENDERGRAST, supra note 35, at 149.
102. AMA Report, supra note 76.
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Joyce-Couch v. DeSilva, °3 the first case where a malpractice judg-
ment was awarded to a patient in recovered memory therapy, illus-
trates the potential harm of drug-induced therapy. In 1980, Joyce-
Couch went to DeSilva, a psychiatrist, because of recurrent dizziness
for which her physician could find no physical cause. After advising
Joyce-Couch that her problems were caused by information that she
had been repressing in her subconscious, DeSilva conducted between
141 and 171 sodium pentothal interviews over a four-year period. 10 4
Expert witnesses for Joyce-Couch testified that while the use of so-
dium pentothal interviews is an accepted form of treatment to dis-
cover repressed traumatic events, no more than six to twelve such
interviews should be given to any one patient. Also, the experts testi-
fied that once the repressed information is discovered, the therapist
should reveal the trauma to the patient and begin to help the patient
cope with the trauma. 5 Testimony indicated that although DeSilva
learned through the interviews conducted during 1980 that, as a child,
Joyce-Couch was sexually abused by her mother, he told her he did
not yet know what was wrong. A year later, he told her she had been
molested as a child, but that she would need to continue the inter-
views to discover who had molested her.
10 6
Joyce-Couch's reliance on DeSilva was heightened by his telling her
that he was the only one who could help her. In spite of his warning,
Joyce-Couch sought treatment from a psychologist in 1984 who testi-
fied that she had become addicted to the sodium pentothal and suf-
fered from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of DeSilva's
treatment. 0 7 The jury awarded Joyce-Couch $125,000 in compensa-
tory damages. 08 During her four years of treatment by DeSilva,
Joyce-Couch went from a functioning person with some dizziness and
unresolved anger from her childhood to a non-functioning person on
psychiatric disability, who was "unable to work, unable to sleep and
[who] did little but stay at her home." 0 9
103. 602 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
104. Id. at 289.
105. Id. at 288-89.
106. Id. at 289.
107. Id
108. Id. at 288. Because of Joyce-Couch's use of marijuana while she was being treated by
DeSilva, the jury found that she was forty percent negligent, and judgment was entered for
$75,000. ld. at 289. However, the court of appeals determined that a jury instruction on compar-
ative negligence was improper since there had been no evidence that her marijuana use was the
proximate cause of her distress. Id. at 295. Additionally, the court of appeals reversed the di-
rected verdict entered in DeSilva's favor on the issue of punitive damages, finding that the evi-
dence supported the inference that "DeSilva exercised a conscious disregard for appellant's
rights and safety and that his conduct had a great probability of causing substantial harm." Id. at
293.
109. Id. at 289.
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In the first malpractice case brought by the target of a civil claim
based on repressed memories, Gary Ramona sued his daughter's ther-
apists after his daughter said she had recovered memories of him sex-
ually abusing her.110 On May 13, 1994, the jury awarded Ramona
$475,000. In a ten-to-two decision, the jury determined that Holly
Ramona's memories were probably false and that although the ther-
apists had not implanted the memories of abuse in his daughter, they
had reinforced them. 1 '
Holly Ramona first sought treatment in 1989 for bulimia nervosa
(an eating disorder involving binging and self-induced vomiting).
Although she had never considered herself to be a sexual abuse vic-
tim, her therapist told her mother that seventy to eighty percent of
bulimics have been sexually abused." 2 After attending group therapy
sessions at which sexual victimization was discussed, Holly began hav-
ing flashbacks of being abused, as a child, by her father. A psychia-
trist, at the request of the therapist, conducted several sodium amytal
interviews. According to the therapist, the interviews revealed that
Gary Ramona had repeatedly raped Holly from the time she was five
until she was seven. When Holly expressed doubts about such abuse,
both the therapist and the psychiatrist assured her it was impossible,
without training, to lie while under the influence of sodium amytal.
113
According to trial testimony, Holly also testified that she recovered
memories of her father saying that her grandmother had been raped
by her brothers (her grandmother denied this) and to her father forc-
ing her to orally copulate the family dog."14 Like the jury in the
Franklin case, this jury heard conflicting testimony from the experts.
Terr, who testified for the psychiatrist, said that children who survive
repeated and secret abuse put themselves in trances during the inci-
dents. Since they do not tell anyone, including themselves, about the
abuse, some of their memories may never get transferred to the part
of the brain where stories are kept. Terr interviewed Holly for three
hours, read the depositions, therapy notes and other psychological ex-
ams. She concluded that Holly showed signs of sexual abuse because
Holly, among other things, was terrified of men, slept with her knees
tight against her chest, was terrified of gynecological exams, had a
sense of doom about her future, and was convinced she would never
marry.115
110. LoFrus & ROSENWALD, supra note 100, at 71. See also MacNamara, supra note 9, at 36.
111. Butler, supra note 44.
112. LoFrus & ROSENWALD, supra note 100, at 71.
113. Id. at 71-72.
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On the other side of the case was Loftus, who testified that Holly
had been subjected to "an outrageous degree of suggestion." '116 In
rebuttal to Terr's testimony, the defense introduced evidence that
Holly's memories were a false but coherent story spliced together
from true events: "remembrances of childhood enemas, normal fa-
therly good-nights, a traumatic childhood urethral exam, and the dis-
turbing sexual play of a neighborhood child.""' 7
The precedential value of the Ramona jury verdict remains an un-
answered question unless the decision is appealed and upheld. How-
ever, it does evidence society's willingness to hold psychotherapists in
recovered memory cases accountable to both the patient and the ac-
cused. There is no clear cut rule about the duty psychotherapists have
in treating patients with repressed memory."" Some critics believe
that during the 1970's and 1980's, when the horrifying extent of sexual
abuse and incest began to surface, well-meaning clinicians began ad-
vocating a "leap of faith" approach.11 9 Therapists began presuming
the accuracy of a recovered memory of sexual abuse in order to foster
the important therapeutic atmosphere of trust.
20
Many therapists take the position that if patients are cured, it does
not matter whether they have worked through traumatic realities or
traumatic fantasies. These therapists believe that even if a memory is
objectively false, if it is real to the patient, then who can say that it is
not, in some basic and critical sense, real?12 On the other hand, un-
less the therapist addresses the historical accuracy of any memory in-
volving accusations of abuse, could they harm the patients by treating
them for conditions that may not exist? 2 2 Dr. Paul McHugh, a psy-
chiatrist at Johns Hopkins Medical School, believes that therapists
who do not feel it is their job to judge their patients' credibility are
making a mistake. "By not making an attempt to find additional con-
firmation for what the patient is telling you, you are ultimately saying
that you believe the patient simply because the patient's feelings are
so intense .... Yet, feelings can mislead."' 23
The American Psychiatric Association has issued guidelines clarify-
ing the psychiatrist's role in repressed memory cases. Among the di-
rectives are to "maintain an empathetic, non-judgmental, neutral
stance towards reported memories of sexual abuse," and to "avoid
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Lorus & RosENwAL., supra note 100, at 72.
119. Id. at 56.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 135.
123. Gorman, supra note 6.
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prejudging the cause of the patient's difficulties or the veracity of the
patient's reports."'124 Clinicians are urged not to "exert pressure on
patients to believe in events that may not have occurred, or to prema-
turely disrupt important relationships or make other important deci-
sions based on these speculations."125
IV. SCmNTwic VALiDrrY
In repressed memory lawsuits, juries must decide whether the re-
covered memories of childhood sexual abuse are true.126 Many juries
tend to believe that such memories are credible.' 27 Cases usually
come down to the accuser's vividly detailed, highly emotional tale of
unspeakable acts versus the accused's simple statement that it did not
happen. Lack of evidence is seen as consistent with molestation,
which by its very nature is secret, unspoken and leaves few physical
scars.12 A 1991-92 report by a San Diego grand jury concluded that,
"[b]ecause (molestation) can rarely be proven, the system seems de-
termined to err on the side of assuming guilt - that which cannot be
proven to be false must be true.' 29 Because sexual abuse is by nature
a hidden, private act, determining guilt or innocence is usually a mat-
ter of emotion, character and conviction. 3 °
Defendants in repressed memory cases are now raising scientific ar-
guments to exclude both lay witness testimony and expert testimony.
For expert testimony to be admitted at trial, the specialized knowl-
edge to be imparted by the expert must be such as would assist the
trier of fact.' 3 1 The credibility and reliability of witnesses have tradi-
tionally been considered exclusively within the province of the ju-
rors. 32 Consequently, courts have usually barred expert testimony
that impinges on those jury prerogatives. Average citizens, using their
common sense and real life experiences, are deemed able to deter-
mine not only whether a witness is being honest, but also whether an
honest person's perceptions are accurate reflections of external real-
ity.133 While expert testimony on "normal" memory processes may
124. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 77.
125. Id.
126. Bannon, supra note 15, at 854.
127. Kessler, supra note 52, at 7. Jennifer Hoult was awarded $500,000 in damages in a civil
suit after recovering memories during therapy that her father raped her as many as 3,000 times
between the ages of six and sixteen. Id. Her father unsuccessfully appealed the verdict. Hoult
v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995).
128. Ness, supra note 10, at Al.
129. Id.
130. PENDERORAST, supra note 35, at 86.
131. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
2786, 2795 (1993).
132. Barall, supra note 64, at 1481.
133. Id. at 1481-82.
1996]
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justifiably be rejected as within the realm of common knowledge of an
average juror, recovered memory is not a phenomenon with which the
average juror can be expected to be familiar."M "The idea that a per-
son could suddenly remember, years later, a vivid occurrence that
theretofore had never entered his or her consciousness may well strike
the lay juror as completely preposterous, or indicative of pure in-
sanity."' 35 Accordingly, expert testimony would probably be neces-
sary to help the jury evaluate the validity of the witness' once
repressed but now retrieved memory. However, since such cases will
usually hinge on the credibility of the accusing and the accused wit-
nesses, juries might have to choose sides in a battle of the experts.'36
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,37 the Supreme
Court articulated the definitive threshold standard governing the ad-
missibility of expert testimony. Prior to this ruling, expert opinion
based on' a scientific technique was inadmissible unless the technique
was "generally accepted" in the relevant scientific community. 38 In
Daubert, the Supreme Court ruled that the Frye "general acceptance"
test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and specifically Rule 702.139 Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, techni-
cal, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to un-
derstand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or ed-
ucation, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."'140
The Daubert Court set forth a two-part test which must be met for
expert testimony to be properly admitted under Rule 702: (1) the tes-
timony must consist of scientific knowledge that is supported by ap-
propriate validation, and (2) the evidence or testimony must "assist
the trier of fact to understand [the evidence] or [to] determine a fact
in issue."'' To satisfy the first prong of the test, trial courts may con-
sider several factors: (1) whether the theory or technique can be, and
has been, tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been sub-
jected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate
of error; and (4) the degree of acceptance within the relevant scientific
community.142
134. Id. at 1483.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1487.
137. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (ruling that the district court erred in excluding certain expert
testimony regarding whether the drug Bendectin causes birth defects on the grounds that the
expert testimony was not sufficiently based on epidemiological evidence to establish causation).
138. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (App. D.C. 1923).
139. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793-94.
140. FED. R. Evm. 702.
141. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
142. Id. at 2796-97.
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A. Scientific Knowledge
In connection with a theory's testability and rate of error (the first
and third factors under Daubert's first prong), the Court noted that
"[s]cientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and
testing them to see if they can be falsified," and "[t]he criterion of the
scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or
testability. '143 It is this lack of falsifiability of the repressed memory
theory that concerns its critics. As Loftus explains the premise of
falsifiability,
Scientists can't just pronounce that the earth is round or the force of
gravity keeps our feet on the ground without offering evidence in sup-
port of their theories .... A scientific theory has to be falsiflable,
which means that, in principle at least, some other scientist can come
along and create an experiment designed to prove that the earth isn't
round or that gravity doesn't keep us grounded. 144
Loftus notes the impossibility of proving or disproving an unconscious
and unknowable process of the human mind . 4s According to psy-
chologist Martin Seligman, a theory must be shown that it can be dis-
proved in order to achieve scientific credibility. Yet, the truth of a
retrieved repressed memory cannot, without outside corroboration, be
proved or disproved. 46 Although the extent of the error rate is un-
known, false memories do occur. Some cases have included allega-
tions based on recovered memories in which it was impossible that the
remembered event occurred. These cases include memories of alien
abductions. 47 A further indication of the potential for false memories
is the recantation of a growing number of those who once claimed
recovered memories. 148 During group memory recovery therapy,
Lynn Gondolf discovered memories of her father raping her. After
she stopped therapy, she realized "her therapist had coerced her and
other members of her group into imagining memories of abuse."'1 49 In
1994, Steven Cook retracted his accusations of being molested seven-
teen years earlier by a cardinal of the Catholic church. Cook's accusa-
tions stemmed from memories recovered under hypnosis. He began
to doubt the accuracy of those memories after obtaining a second
143. Id. at 2797 (citations omitted).
144. LoFrus & KETCHAM, supra note 12, at 64.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 163-64. See also Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055, 1065 (E.D. Mich.
1995) (testimony by plaintiff's psychological expert that repressed memory cannot be tested
empirically).
147. LoFrus & KETc-AM, supra note 12, at 165.
148. Bannon, supra note 15, at 844.
149. Id.
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opinion from a clinical psychologist, and subsequently dropped his ten
million dollar civil lawsuit. 5 °
Critics of repressed memory claim that no empirical scientific evi-
dence supports the theory that a person can lose a memory for many
years and then accurately recover it.151 According to research psy-
chologist David Holmes of the University of Kansas, who reviewed
sixty years of research on memory repression, there are no controlled
studies showing that an event can be accurately reproduced in mem-
ory after a long period of repression. By its very nature, repressed
memory does not lend itself to empirical assessment.153 The traumatic
event supposedly being remembered usually will have occurred in pri-
vate, with no witnesses other than the accuser and the alleged perpe-
trator. Since the alleged perpetrator will have every reason to deny
the incident occurred, the accuser will be the sole source of informa-
tion available to someone studying the phenomenon.'554
As to the second factor a court may consider to determine whether
the proffered evidence is scientific knowledge, the Daubert Court
stated that publication, or lack thereof, in a peer-reviewed journal was
a relevant, but not dispositive, consideration.' 55 While publication
does not necessarily correlate with reliability, submission of a novel
technique to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component
of "good science" because it increases the likelihood that substantial
flaws in the methodology will be detected. 6 While there has been a
plethora of articles published and studies conducted on the repressed
memory theory, there has been little agreement that the theory can be
rationally and scientifically exhibited. Further, critics point out that
through publication of their studies, the substantial flaws in the meth-
odology indicate that the repressed memory theory is not "good
science."'
1 57
The final factor a court may consider in determining scientific valid-
ity relates to the "general acceptance" of the theory or technique. 8
Within the field of psychotherapy, not only is there a lack of consen-
150. Id. at 844-45. See also Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert
and the Law's Hubris, 43 EMORY L.J. 913 (1994).
151. Bannon, supra note 15, at 845.
152. Loftus, You Must Remember This, supra note 42, at CO1.
153. Barall, supra note 64, at 1484.
154. Id.
155. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
156. Id.
157. See MacNamara, supra note 9, at 43.
158. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
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sus on the accuracy of recalled repressed memories, there is vehement
disagreement.'5 9
Several scientific societies have published reports of their official
position on repressed memories. Unlike the lack of consensus among
practitioners in the psychotherapy field, these positions uniformly re-
flect concerns that both the methodology used to retrieve repressed
memories and the accuracy of such memories are questionable. The
American Medical Association stated its position in the 1994 Report
of the Council on Scientific Affairs: "The AMA considers recovered
memories of childhood sexual abuse to be of uncertain authenticity,
which should be subject to external verification. The use of recovered
memories is fraught with problems of potential misapplication."' 6 °
In 1993, the American Psychiatric Association issued its Statement
on Memories of Sexual Abuse acknowledging that "it is not known
how to distinguish, with complete accuracy, memories based on true
events from those derived from other sources."' 6  It further noted
that "there is no completely accurate way of determining the validity
of reports [of adults who report memories of sexual abuse] in the ab-
sence of corroborating information."'162 In an ambiguously worded
statement issued in 1993, the American Psychological Association
noted that while long forgotten memories of abuse can be
remembered, it is possible to construct pseudomemories for events
that never occurred. 61 The Association explained that the mecha-
nisms that produce delayed recall and pseudomemories are "not cur-
rently well understood," and the report concluded that "[t]here are
gaps in our knowledge about the processes that lead to accurate and
inaccurate recollections of childhood abuse."'
64
Even before the formation of the Daubert test, courts were faced
with the lack of objective, verifiable evidence in repressed memory
cases. These concerns were first addressed in the 1986 decision in Ty-
son v. Tyson.'6 In Tyson, the plaintiff alleged that her father commit-
ted multiple acts of sexual assault upon her from the time she was
three until she was eleven. She alleged that the sexual assaults caused
her to repress all memory of the acts until she entered psychotherapy
at age twenty-six. The Washington Supreme Court declined to apply
the discovery rule because there was no empirical evidence to verify
159. See Isely v. Capuchin, 877 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Ault v. Jasko, 637 N.E.2d
870, 875 (Ohio 1994) (Wright, J., dissenting); Milich, supra note 150.
160. AMA Report, supra note 76.
161. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 77.
162. Id.
163. Am. Psychological Ass'n, Working Group on Investigation of Memories of Childhood
Abuse, INmEIm REPORT (1994).
164. 1d.
165. 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986).
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the existence of the alleged acts.'66 In rejecting the availability of tes-
timony from expert psychological and psychiatric witnesses, the ma-
jority explained that "[u]nlike the biological sciences, their methods of
investigation are primarily subjective and most of their findings are
not based on physically observable evidence."' 167 The court noted that
studies had questioned the assumption that an analyst has any special
ability to help a patient determine the historical truth.
The Tyson court also questioned the psychoanalytic process, point-
ing out the possibility that the analyst could influence the patient's
memories and alter the patient's statements about his or her memo-
ries based on the analyst's own "predisposition, expectations, and in-
tention to use them to explain the subject's problems."' 68 While
conceding that psychoanalysis helps treat one's emotional problems,
the court cautioned that "the trier of fact in legal proceedings cannot
assume that [psychoanalysis] will produce an accurate account of
events in the individual's past.'
'16 9
In 1994, in a case of first impression for the Ohio Supreme Court,
the court addressed the scientific validity of the repressed memory
theory. In Ault v. Jasko,170 the twenty-nine-year-old plaintiff alleged
that during therapy, she recovered memories of being sexually abused
by her father beginning when she was twelve years old.17 1 Although
the court applied the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations,
the concurring and dissenting opinions reflected the justices' concerns
about the reliability of memory retrieval. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Resnick wrote that since the court was considering only the
trial court's granting of the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it was
not ruling on the merits of the plaintiff's allegations. However, Justice
Resnick acknowledged being "troubled by the potential unreliability
of recovered memories."'172
166. Id. at 229. Following this decision, Washington became the first state to enact legislation
specifically addressing the statute of limitations in childhood sexual abuse cases. Rebecca L.
Thomas, Note, Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse and Statutes of Limitations: A Call
for Legislative Action, 26 WAxE FOREST L. REV. 1245, 1269 (1991).
167. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 229. See also Louisiana v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116, 1125 (La. 1993)
("[P]sychodynamic theories on the explanation of human behavior is, at best, a science that is
difficult to impossible to test for accuracy .... Thus, the key question of testability in determin-
ing whether a technique is valid enough for admissibility cannot be conclusively answered.") Id.
at 1125.
168. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 229.
169. Id.
170. 637 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio 1994).
171. Id. at 871. "The plaintiff sought professional help for depression and anxiety. Her
treatment included therapy and medication from a social worker, a psychologist and a psychia-
trist." Id. at 877 (Wright, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 873 (Resnick, J., concurring).
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Both dissenting opinions discussed the lack of reliable information
on repressed memory. Chief Justice Moyer proposed that the proper
forum for determining whether statutes of limitations should be tolled
in such cases was the General Assembly, where "all views, all relevant
information, all scientific data, and all empirical studies can be
presented, reviewed and debated ... ."I' Chief Justice Moyer further
cautioned that the day had not yet arrived when courts could be given
"reliable, competent information on the issue of repressed
memory."'174
Justice Wright's dissent offered a discourse on the controversy, con-
cluding that "the methods used by psychologists and psychoanalysts to
retrieve repressed memories are unreliable and are not sufficiently es-
tablished to have gained a general acceptance in the fields of either
forensic or clinical psychology .... Justice Wright expressed con-
cern about therapists' techniques and about the possibility that their
suggestions, unwittingly or otherwise, could implant in their patients'
minds repressed memories of sexual abuse.
76
In noting the similarities between the practice of retrieving re-
pressed memories and the science of polygraphy, Justice Wright noted
that both procedures place "unusual responsibility on the examiner"
and are "fraught with unreliability."'1 77 As to the "general accept-
ance" in the psychotherapeutic community of the practice of memory
retrieval, Justice Wright noted that "[w]idespread acceptance can be
an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and 'a
known technique that has been able to attract only minimal support
within the community' may properly be viewed with
skepticism.'
178
Even some courts that have indicated a willingness to apply the
delayed discovery rule in repressed memory cases have recognized
that the lack of scientific evidence regarding the authenticity and reli-
ability of recovered memories will be an issue for the trial court.179 In
Olsen v. Hooley, 80 the court noted that "the inherent reliability and
admissibility of expert testimony regarding memory repression and re-
vival may be an issue that will have to be reached at trial."'' In hold-
ing that the discovery rule applied in the case, the court specified that
173. Id. at 874 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 875 (Wright, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 876.
177. Id. at 877.
178. Id. (quoting Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795, 2797 (1993)).
179. See, e.g., Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1993) (requiring the plaintiff to produce
corroborating evidence of the abuse in order to toll the statute of limitations).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1350.
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the plaintiff's burden at trial would be to prove that "she did in fact
repress a memory of actual facts.'
A Michigan federal district court recently took a lenient approach
to the Daubert standard of admissibility of expert testimony on this
controversial theory. In Isely v. Capuchin Province,183 the court de-
nied the defendants' motions in limine to preclude in toto the plain-
tiff's psychologist expert's testimony on repressed memory.184 Dr.
Carol Hartman, the plaintiff's treating therapist and a professor of
psychiatric nursing at Boston College, testified during an evidentiary
hearing that although there was no way to empirically test repressed
memory, there had been a number of studies conducted that validated
the theory. She also testified that she had written articles and book
chapters discussing the brain functions before and after a trauma with
a focus on the memory of adolescents. 185 She acknowledged that
although there was not universal acceptance of the theory in the field,
there was a fair degree of acceptance. 86
In determining that the testimony was admissible, the court found
that the studies and writings constituted a sufficient scientific basis of
support for the theory.187 By its ruling, the court seemed to ignore, or
at the very least, downplay the importance of several factors that, ac-
cording to the Daubert test, would indicate that the theory was not
"scientific knowledge": (1) the theory cannot be empirically tested,
and (2) there is substantial disagreement within the field as to the the-
ory itself and the techniques used to retrieve the memories. As a re-
sult of this ruling, the Isely jury will be subjected to a courtroom
scientific debate over the reliability of complex evidence which will
neither assist the jury nor lead to a rational determination of the facts
at issue.18
8
The court concluded that Dr. Hartman could testify as to her theo-
ries and opinions concerning repressed memory and whether the
plaintiff's behavior was consistent with someone suffering from re-
pressed memory.'8 9 The court, however, did limit the scope of her
testimony by barring her from stating whether she believes the plain-
182. Id.
183. 877 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
184. Id. at 1067. The plaintiff alleged that he had been sexually abused by several priests
while he was a student at seminary. Id.
185. Id. at 1067.
186. Id. at 1065. Dr. Hartman testified that studies done by Elizabeth Loftus, one of the
major detractors, had been countered by others in the field. Id.
187. Id. at 1066.
188. In Daubert, the court stated that assisting the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue "goes primarily to relevance," i.e., whether the expert's testimony
relates to any issue in the case. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. See also Milich, supra note 150, at
923.
189. Isely, 877 F. Supp. at 1067.
[Vol. 22:56
23
McAlister: The Repressed Memory Phenomenon: Are Recovered Memories Scientifi
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1996
1996] THE REPRESSED MEMORY PHENOMENON 79
tiff or whether she believes that the incidents he alleges occurred.
"Such testimony would invade the province of the jury... and... be
unhelpful to the jury since everything she knows about the alleged
events is hearsay .... ,19o A similar warning was issued in New Hamp-
shire v. Cressey when the court stated that "[e]xpert psychological evi-
dence can only be admissible... if it is at least partly based on factors
in addition to and independent of the victim's account."'191
In May 1995, a Maryland court was faced with its first test of recov-
ered memory in a sexual abuse case when Circuit Judge Kaplan dis-
missed a civil suit filed by two former students against a Catholic
priest who allegedly molested them twenty-five years ago.' 92 In ruling
that the plaintiffs' memories did not qualify for an exception to the
state's statute of limitations, the judge noted that their recollections
"did not meet the test of scientific reliability" and that since there are
no empirical studies to verify the existence of the phenomenon, there
was no way to validate the memories. 93
B. Helpfulness
The second requirement, according to Daubert, for expert testi-
mony to be properly admitted under Rule 702 is that such testimony
"assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue.' 94 This prong was referred to as the "helpfulness test"
of Rule 702 in United States v. Downing.95 The issue presented to the
Downing court was whether expert testimony on the reliability of eye-
witness identification should have been admitted in the trial of a de-
fendant convicted solely on the basis of eyewitness testimony. 96 The
court remanded the case for the trial court to determine the admissi-
bility of the evidence based on a balancing test of two components:
(1) whether the scientific principles upon which the expert testimony
rested were sufficiently reliable to enable the testimony to aid the jury
in reaching an accurate resolution of the disputed issue, and (2)
whether the testimony could overwhelm or mislead the jury.
1 97
190. Id.
191. 628 A.2d 696, 700 (1993) (holding that it was reversible error for the State's psychologi-
cal expert to conclude that the child victims in a criminal trial had been sexually abused).
192. Robert A. Erlandson, Recovered Memory Claim Denied in Sex Abuse Case BALTIMORE
MORNING SuN, May 6, 1995, at 1A.
193. Id
194. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. See also supra note 141 and accompanying text.
195. 753 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1985).
196. Id. at 1243. The court overturned the defendant's conviction on charges of mail fraud,
wire fraud and interstate transportation of stolen property. Because the crucial evidence against
the defendant consisted solely of eyewitness identification, the court found that excluding the
proffered expert testimony was not harmless error. Id.
197. Id. at 1226.
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The court noted that if a jury must accept the expert's own asser-
tions as to the accuracy of his or her conclusions instead of being
presented with the data on which the expert relies, the jury may be
misled. 9 ' In repressed memory cases, the only information on which
the expert can rely is the alleged victim's recollections; thus, a juror
would have no independent basis on which to evaluate the accuracy of
the expert's testimony. The Downing court also noted that techniques
that rely on the expert's subjective judgment to draw conclusions from
the data on which the testimony is based would raise the possibility of
confusing or misleading a jury.'99 Finally, the court noted that novel
scientific evidence carries with it concerns over trustworthiness and
reliability, and that "[w]hen there is a serious question of reliability of
evidence, it is appropriate for the court to exercise.., an evidentiary
screening function.
2 0
On the state court level, trial judges appear willing to exhibit a more
rigorous "gatekeeping" role in determining whether to admit re-
pressed memory testimony. In a May 1995 ruling in New Hampshire,
a superior court judge barred testimony from victims in two criminal
sexual assault cases who allegedly recovered memories through ther-
apy.201 The court determined that the concept of repressed memory
and its recovery through therapy were clearly scientific processes and
that before a jury could decide the credibility of the witnesses, the jury
would need to understand the method by which the testimony was
developed. This requirement necessitated the application of the
Daubert directive that "the trial judge must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reli-
able. ' 2 2 Thus, the court reasoned that it had a duty to ascertain, prior
to the admission of the victims' testimony, the scientific validity of the
phenomenon of repressed memory and the process by which it was
recovered. o3
As to the repressed memory theory itself, the court determined that
due to the inappropriate application of many of the studies to the phe-
nomenon and the substantial flaws in the methodology used in those
studies,2 °4 the "testability may be seriously challenged and refutability
198. Id. at 1239.
199. Id
200. ld. at 1240.
201. State v. Hungerford, 1995 WL 37857, at *1 (N.H. Super. 1995).
202. Id. at *2 (quoting Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795).
203. Id. at *3.
204. Id. at *8. Judge Gross noted several deficiencies in the survey studies cited in support of
the existence of the repressed memory theory: (1) the failure to account for the recognized
inability of children to form narrative memories before the age of five, (2) the failure to confirm
or corroborate the occurrence of the alleged trauma, and (3) the ambiguity of the survey ques-
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may be seriously advanced. '20 5 In connection with the falsifiability of
the phenomenon, Judge Groff wrote, "there is absolutely no ability,
absent independent corroboration or confirmation, to determine
whether a particular 'repressed memory' is false or true. 2 0 6 He then
cited the potential for false memories and the inability to identify
them.207
The court found that expert testimony would be required in a re-
pressed memory case, since the concept of a repressed memory "tran-
scends human experience. 2 0 8 But it went on to explain that, even if
the experts could distinguish a true memory from a false memory,
their testimony would usurp the jury's function of determining witness
credibility since they would be advising the jurors as to the truth or
existence of the facts themselves. 0 9 While noting that therapy is in-
herently suggestive, the court determined that the reliability of the
victims' memories were diminished by several factors: the techniques
used by the therapists, the rapid confirmation by the therapists of the
events as recalled by the plaintiffs, and the therapists' failure to verify
or attempt to corroborate the abuse.1 0
V. CONCLUSION
The Daubert decision puts trial judges in the position of having to
evaluate the scientific principles or methodologies underlying the pro-
posed testimony to determine whether those methodologies are scien-
tifically valid. The majority felt confident that federal judges would be
able to undertake such a review. The repressed memory phenome-
non may be the ultimate test of that capability. Within the psychologi-
cal sciences, much of the data is subjective and many of the theories
are difficult, if not possible, to empirically test. 1 2 Yet the Daubert
Court regarded the testability of a theory or technique as a "key ques-
tion" in determining if it is scientific knowledge. 3 Critics of the re-
pressed memory theory claim that its lack of falsifiability precludes it
from being a valid scientific theory. 4 When faced with arguments by
the experts on the falsifiability of repressed memory, trial judges may
tions such that it was impossible to ascertain whether the failure to remember was in fact mem-
ory repression, or merely normal forgetting or reluctance to disclose the experience. Id.
205. Id. at *11.
206. Id.
207. Id See supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id at *14.
211. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
212. Milich, supra note 150, at 917.
213. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 144-150.
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find themselves in the same dilemma as Chief Justice Rehnquist when
he wrote, "I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the
scientific status of a theory depends on its 'falsifiability.' "215
The excerpts from The Courage to Heal at the beginning of this
Comment illustrate the dichotomy of the repressed memory phenom-
enon. In one camp, there are those who believe that every recovered
memory of abuse is true, regardless of the method by which the mem-
ory was retrieved or whether there is any corroboration. For this
group, the most important "truth" is whether the patient believes the
abuse occurred. In the opposing camp, there are those who believe
that the only relevant truth is that which can be proved in a court of
law. Every therapy patient needs to have a relationship of trust with
his or her therapist. Yet uncritical acceptance of every single claim of
a recovered memory of sexual abuse, no matter how bizarre, is not
good for anyone. Its effect will be that society will begin to doubt the
true cases of abuse.
Incest and sexual abuse are horrible crimes, and those who commit
them should be punished. Yet the court must treat evidence of recal-
led repressed memory in the same manner as any other novel scien-
tific theory. It must determine whether the theory is scientifically
valid. The test under Daubert is not unreasonable.
CYNTHIA V. MCALISTER
215. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2800 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring/dissenting).
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